Britain and ‘Europe’: teaching a tale of two stories: The question of the most appropriate form the relationship Britain should have with the institutions and countries of the European Union (EU) has been one of the most explosive in British politics since the Second World War. Disputes and tensions over British European policy have divided Cabinets, split parties, brought down leaders and left the public in a state of confusion and even hostility to matters European. One’s stance on whether or not Britain is a ‘European’ country – and therefore what part Britain can and should play in the EU – is basically down to a preference for one of two main stories on offer. The first story pits Britain eternally against the Continent, in geographic, political, economic and ideological terms. This story tells of Britain’s psychological remoteness from mainland Europe, evidenced by its preference for nurturing first of all its global role through its Empire/Commonwealth, and latterly the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Europe in this story features at best as an optional prop to Britain’s great power status, and at worst as a hindrance to the achievement of just that destiny.
The second narrative, popularised by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and the New Labour government from 1997 (see [2]), has it that Britain has always been a European power, and that it is a denial of the nation’s history and geography to take a ‘Eurosceptical’ stance by falling for the, admittedly popular and persuasive, first story. It is this battle between two rival narratives that underpin a final year option, Euroscepticism in Britain, which I have been delivering in the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University since 2005. In this article I want to reflect on some successful teaching innovations I have made to the design and delivery of the module, brought about by an immersion in quantitative methods...
Britain and ‘Europe’: teaching a tale of two stories: The question of the most appropriate form the relationship Britain should have with the institutions and countries of the European Union (EU) has been one of the most explosive in British politics since the Second World War. Disputes and tensions over British European policy have divided Cabinets, split parties, brought down leaders and left the public in a state of confusion and even hostility to matters European. One’s stance on whether or not Britain is a ‘European’ country – and therefore what part Britain can and should play in the EU – is basically down to a preference for one of two main stories on offer. The first story pits Britain eternally against the Continent, in geographic, political, economic and ideological terms. This story tells of Britain’s psychological remoteness from mainland Europe, evidenced by its preference for nurturing first of all its global role through its Empire/Commonwealth, and latterly the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Europe in this story features at best as an optional prop to Britain’s great power status, and at worst as a hindrance to the achievement of just that destiny.
The second narrative, popularised by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and the New Labour government from 1997 (see [2]), has it that Britain has always been a European power, and that it is a denial of the nation’s history and geography to take a ‘Eurosceptical’ stance by falling for the, admittedly popular and persuasive, first story. It is this battle between two rival narratives that underpin a final year option, Euroscepticism in Britain, which I have been delivering in the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University since 2005. In this article I want to reflect on some successful teaching innovations I have made to the design and delivery of the module, brought about by an immersion in quantitative methods...
maths, mathematics, politics, service teaching, political science, analysis, teaching, learning, employability, transferable skills, MSOR Connections Feb 2010 Vol 10 No
